Does eliminating benefit eligibility requirements improve unemployed job search and labour market outcomes? by Gerards, Ruud & Welters, Riccardo
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rael20
Applied Economics Letters
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rael20
Does eliminating benefit eligibility requirements
improve unemployed job search and labour
market outcomes?
Ruud Gerards & Riccardo Welters
To cite this article: Ruud Gerards & Riccardo Welters (2021): Does eliminating benefit eligibility
requirements improve unemployed job search and labour market outcomes?, Applied Economics
Letters, DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2021.1927960
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2021.1927960
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
View supplementary material 
Published online: 23 May 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 777
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Does eliminating benefit eligibility requirements improve unemployed job 
search and labour market outcomes?
Ruud Gerards a and Riccardo Welters a,b,c
aResearch Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA), Maastricht University, Maastricht, , The Netherlands; bCentre of Full Employment 
and Equity, University of Newcastle, Newcastle, Australia; cCollege of Business, Law and Governance, James Cook University, Townsville, 
Australia
ABSTRACT
Benefit eligibility requirements intend to incentivize the unemployed to find work more quickly. 
Our results, in an Australian context, suggest that those subjected to benefit eligibility require-
ments, despite searching at least as hard, take longer to find employment. Moreover, they spend 
less time in employment in the first twelve months and, if employed, have jobs with lower wages 
and fewer hours compared to otherwise similar unemployed without benefit eligibility require-
ments. Our findings are consistent with cognitive theories that emphasize that benefit eligibility 
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I. Introduction
Local governments are increasingly using ‘trust 
experiments’ that waive job search requirements, 
compliance obligations and sanctions normally 
imposed on the unemployed; in favour of uncondi-
tional trust in the efforts and initiatives of the 
unemployed (Groot, Muffels, and Verlaat 2019). 
Proponents of trust experiments argue that reliev-
ing the unemployed of stresses surrounding Benefit 
Eligibility Requirements (BERs) enhances their 
ensuing labour market outcomes.
Inspired by labour supply and search theory and 
early experimental evidence (e.g. Meyer 1995), 
BERs were introduced to induce the unemployed 
to (a) search harder, supposedly leading to higher 
probability and/or quality of future employment, 
or (b) reduce their reservation wage, purportedly 
leading to higher probability of future employment 
at the expense of its quality. However, cognitive 
theories predict different outcomes. For example, 
Conservation of Resources theory (COR) argues 
that the threat of losing resources (e.g. unemploy-
ment benefits) causes stress and fatigue, which 
reduces job search effectiveness leading to lower re- 
employment quality (Hobfoll 1989; Lim et al. 
2016). Further, Self Determination Theory (SDT) 
argues that external search motivation (e.g. ema-
nating from BERs) – as opposed to more autono-
mous motivation – compromises goal achievement 
(Deci and Ryan 2000). Van Hooft, Wanberg, and 
Van Hoye (2013) and Koen et al. (2016) confirm 
that external motivation reduces job search engage-
ment and makes job search haphazard, respec-
tively. Both effects compromise the concomitant 
employment probability and quality (Koen et al. 
2016; Gerards and Welters 2020; Caliendo, 
Tatsiramos, and Uhlendorff 2013).
Both labour supply and search theories and cog-
nitive theories agree that the threat of repercus-
sions of BER non-compliance provides the 
unemployed additional job search motivation i.e. 
BERs increase search intensity, but cognitive the-
ories diverge regarding predicted effects on 
employment probability and quality. We empiri-
cally investigate how BERs affect search intensity, 
employment probability and quality outcomes in 
Australia (where BERs are called ‘mutual obliga-
tions’), where we find the exogenous variation and 
rich set of covariates we exploit in our estimation 
strategy.
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Australia introduced Mutual Obligations (MOs) 
in 1997 to reduce welfare dependency. MOs consist 
of compulsory attendance to activities including 
job search training sessions, intensive assistance 
sessions (one-on-one job search support) and 
Work-for-the-Dole (the default activity).1 
Penalties for breaching MOs vary from periods of 
partial to periods of complete withdrawal of 
income support (Davidson and Whiteford 2012). 
Both the threat of income loss and having to spend 
time on compulsory activities are sources of stress 
and reduced autonomy to job seekers (e.g. 
Saunders 2007). Using difference-in-differences 
techniques, Richardson (2002) and Lim (2008) 
find modest increases in job seekers exiting social 
assistance schemes to which the (threat of) BERs 
applies.
To our knowledge, we are the first to assess the 
effects of Australian BERs on job search intensity 
and a range of employment outcomes. We use all 
waves of the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) (spanning 
2001–2019) in a propensity score matching (PSM) 
analysis. PSM requires variations in BER (not 
explained by other exogenous variables) across 
similar unemployed people. These arise for two 
reasons in our data. First, failure – particularly 
immediately after the introduction of or eligibility 
changes to BERs – of case managers to implement 
BERs uniformly (Richardson 2003; Borland 2014) 
implies dissimilar treatment for similar persons. As 
Richardson (2003, 90) puts it: ‘ . . . MOI require-
ments were not strictly enforced’. Second, policy 
changes in BER applicability during 2001–2018 
(e.g. extending BER applicability across age 
cohorts) imply dissimilar treatment for similar per-
sons across time.
II. Materials and methods
The HILDA includes extensive information on 
labour market dynamics and income, allowing 
inclusion of an array of covariates including per-
sonality traits, and, exploiting the panel character, 
several lagged versions of time-variant variables. 
We focus on the unemployed, looking for work, 
aged 15–65 (sample size: 6,253).
The independent variable is exposure to MOs. 
Respondents were asked whether the public 
employment services require activities such as 
Work-for-the-Dole or job search training. We cre-
ate a dummy equalling 1 if any such activities were 
undertaken at the time of the survey (time ‘t’) and 0 
otherwise. We measure job search intensity at ‘t’ as 
hours spent in job search in the survey week. Job 
search outcomes are (1) ‘time-to-employment’ and 
(2) ‘time-in-employment’ (both are counts of 
months between ‘t’ and ‘t + 12ʹ), and (3) the 
employment status at ‘t + 12ʹ (1 if employed). For 
those employed at ‘t + 12ʹ we observe job quality 
(not for other jobs, if any, between ‘t’ and ‘t + 12ʹ). 
Job quality indicators are the hourly and weekly 
gross wage and the number of hours worked.
An unemployed person’s characteristics and cir-
cumstances drive MO applicability and labour 
market outcomes simultaneously. Hence, PSM 
must create pairs of unemployed persons that are 
similar in all relevant personal characteristics and 
circumstances, except for exogenously determined 
MO applicability differences (i.e. the treatment).
Table A1 (supplementary appendix) shows sepa-
rately for the unemployed with and without MOs 
the (differences in) means (before matching) for 
the covariates included in the PSM analysis to 
satisfy conditional independence. As we match 
respondents across time, we include nine covari-
ates to control for changes in labour market envir-
onment. Following Gerards and Welters (2020) 
and Caliendo, Gielen, and Mahlstedt (2015), we 
apply PSM using the Epanechnikov kernel and 
a bandwidth of 0.06. The mean and median stan-
dardized biases in Table 1 summarize successful 
matching; all are well below the recommended 
3–5% range (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Tables 
A2, A3 and Figure A1 (supplementary appendix) 
contain detailed indicators of the successful match-
ing, the propensity score estimates, the propensity 
score distribution, respectively.
III. Results
Table 1 shows that the unemployed subjected to 
MOs sustain (if not increase) their search intensity, 
take longer to find employment and spend less time 
1See Davidson and Whiteford (2012) for details.
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in employment within the first twelve months since 
the identification of the MO. Although MOs do not 
affect employment probabilities twelve months 
later, if a job is secured, those with MOs are in 
lower quality jobs in terms of hourly wage, hours 
worked and (their product) weekly wage, than 
otherwise identical unemployed without MOs. 
Sensitivity and attrition selectivity analyses (sup-
plementary Tables A4–A5) show the robustness of 
these results and no systematic attrition. Further, 
following Clarke, Méndez, and Sepúlveda (2020) 
and Augsburg et al. (2015), we present p-values 
corrected for multiple hypothesis testing 
(Romano and Wolf 2005; Clarke, Romano, and 
Wolf 2019) in supplementary Tables A6–A7. 
Testing the three job search outcomes at once 
(Table A6) and the three job quality outcomes at 
once (Table A7), all effects remain significant. 
Thus, our findings survive these demanding 
corrections.
IV. Discussion
MOs may cause lock-in effects (time allocated to 
fulfiling MOs is time unavailable for job search) or 
reductions in reservation wages. However, the com-
bination of sustained search intensity, longer ‘time- 
to-employment’ and less ‘time-in-employment’ 
rules out both these explanations for our findings. 
In contrast, COR and SDT can explain sustained job 
search intensity and poorer job search outcomes, 
highlighting the adverse effect of MOs on job search 
quality. Based on these theories and related empiri-
cal evidence, we hypothesize that the unemployed 
subject to MOs, exhibit lower job search quality, 
explaining the negative labour market outcomes we 
observe. Future research should study both job 
search intensity and quality effects of BERs and 
extend our first investigation, looking for institu-
tional settings enabling the use of more advanced 
identification strategies.
V. Conclusions
Using Australian panel data, we find evidence sug-
gesting that the unemployed subjected to MOs 
sustain their job search intensity, yet take longer 
to become re-employed and spend less time in 
employment compared to otherwise identical 
unemployed searching without MOs. If they find 
employment, those with MOs are in comparatively 
lower quality jobs. Our findings accord with COR 
and SDT alluding that MOs are an external moti-
vator and stressor that lowers job search quality.
As breaching MOs is punishable by (partial) with-
drawal of income support, MOs constitute a stress 
inducing eligibility requirement that advocates of 
‘trust experiments’ argue should be eliminated to 
improve labour market outcomes. Our results 
accord with this view that supports more uncondi-
tional trust relations with benefit recipients.
Acknowledgments
* This paper uses unit record data from the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. 
The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the 
Australian Government Department of Social Services (DSS) 
and is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied 
Economic and Social Research (Melbourne Institute). The 
findings and views reported in this article, however, are 
Table 1. Matching estimates of MOs on search intensity and job outcomes.





Search intensity at ‘t’ 0.378 0.264 6,253 1,208 5,041 4 1.1 0.7
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